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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to UCA § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether under the undisputed facts the claims of First Equity Federal, Inc., on 
its own behalf and on behalf of Aspen Meadows Homeowners Association ("First Equity") 
should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions on a motion to dismiss for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Thiele v. Anderson, 975 
P.2d 481 (Ut.App. 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure determines Skabelund's 
appeal. Rule 41 (a) (1) provides: 
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of 
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service 
by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the 
complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated 
in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, 
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed 
in any court of the United States or of any state an action based 
on or including the same claim. 
(Emphasis added). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a case brought by First Equity on behalf of itself and Aspen Meadows 
Homeowners Association alleging negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract and 
several other causes of action in connection with two large parcels of real property in Cache 
County, Utah. The complaint seeks specific performance with respect to First Equity's 
alleged rights under various contracts and agreements pertaining to the two parcels of 
property. The complaint also seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
First Equity filed its complaint in this case on or about December 6, 2000. 
Skabelund responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss based on the two dismissal provision of 
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Oral argument on Skabelund's Motion to Dismiss was conducted on March 26, 
2001. On April 17, 2001 the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision denying 
Skabelund's motion. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about August 25,2000, First Equity Federal, Inc., on its own behalf and 
on behalf of Aspen Meadows Homeowners Association and Rocky Mountain Financial, 
L.L.C. filed an action against the following defendants in the First Judicial District Court, 
Case No. 000101312PR: Phillips Development, LC, Peter O. Phillips, Lydia Phillips, Alden 
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B. Turnbow, Larry Andrews, John E. Phillips, Cache Title Company, North Logan City, 
and John and Jane Does I-XXV. [R206] (A copy of First Equity's complaint is attached as 
Addendum "A"). 
On or about September 17,2000, First Equity filed a second complaint against 
the same defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern 
Division, Case No. 1:000CV109C. [R284] (A copy of this complaint is attached as 
Addendum "B"). On or about September 22, 2000, First Equity filed Voluntary Dismissal 
of Case Without Prejudice under U.R.Civ.P. 41 inks first-filed case. [R281] (A copy of the 
September 22, 2000 dismissal is attached as Addendum "C") 
On or about December 18, 2000, First Equity's second complaint was 
dismissed by the Honorable Tena Campbell ("Judge Campbell") pursuant to a Motion to 
Dismiss without Prejudice filed by First Equity. First Equity's Motion to Dismiss, attached 
hereto as Appendix "D," included Skabelund as one of the additional defendants. [R349] 
A copy of the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice, which 
included Skabelund as a named defendant, is attached as Addendum "E"1. [R352] 
On or about December 6,2000, First Equity returned to First District Court and 
filed its complaint in this case, comprising First Equity's third complaint alleging the exact 
same claims. [R358] (A copy of First Equity's third complaint is attached hereto as 
Addendum "G"). Skabelund filed a motion to dismiss based on the two dismissal provision 
*On or about April 10, 2001, First Equity obtained a "clarification" of the order 
dismissing the federal court case stating that the dismissal was without prejudice. [R508] 
(See Order attached hereto as Addendum "F"). 
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of Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R197]. The trial court denied Skabelund's 
motion by Memorandum Decision on April 17, 2001. [R511] (See Addendum at "H"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 41 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates dismissal of First 
Equity' s complaint against Skabelund with prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed 
a Rule 41 (a) dismissal in a factually similar case. It is immaterial whether First Equity' s two 
voluntary dismissals resulted in harassment or abuse where First Equity's dismissal of the 
Federal Case was voluntary within the meaning of Rule 41 (a). Moreover, Skabelund should 
be dismissed, even though he was not explicitly named as a defendant in First Equity' s initial 
First District Court case, because of Skabelund's close relationship to the subject matter of 
the litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MANDATES 
DISMISSAL OF FIRST EQUITY'S COMPLAINT AGAINST 
SKABELUND WITH PREJUDICE 
Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, often referred to as the "two-dismissal 
rule," applies to the voluntary dismissals of a plaintiff s cases and reads as follows: 
[ A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of 
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service 
by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the 
complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated 
in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, 
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
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upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed 
in any court of the United States or of any state an action based 
on or including the same claim. 
(Emphasis added). 
The complaints filed by First Equity in the First Judicial District Court on or 
about August 25, 2000, and in United States District Court on or about September 17, 2000, 
which First Equity voluntarily dismissed, contain the same claims as the third complaint now 
before this Court. First Equity's prior complaints were based upon the same transactions and 
factual allegations as those contained in this Complaint. Accordingly, First Equity's 
voluntary dismissal of the second complaint operates as an adjudication on the merits. Rule 
41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that First Equity's third complaint 
be dismissed with prejudice as against Skabelund. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court has Affirmed a Rule 41(a) Dismissal in a 
Factually Similar Case 
In Thomasv. Brajfet's Heirs, 305 P.2d 507 (Utah 1956) plaintiffs had similarly 
filed and dismissed the same case twice. The trial court found that the court's second 
dismissal at the request of the plaintiffs was an adjudication on the merits because of the 
prior action's dismissal. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred because the rule only provided 
that a second dismissal by notice would operate as an adjudication on the merits, and that the 
rule should not apply where the request for dismissal was actually presented to 
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the court and the court signed an order which recited that the dismissal was without 
prejudice. 
The Utah Supreme Court, looking to federal case law, concluded that a recital 
that the dismissal was without prejudice in the order of dismissal had no effect. Citing 
Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Corp. 10 F.R.D. 32, 34. (D. Md. 1950), 
the Thomas court concluded that a plaintiff could not defeat the express language of the rule 
by the mere recital in its notice of dismissal that it was without prejudice. The court held that 
whether the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal, or the court signs an order prepared by the 
plaintiff, it is an ex, parte dismissal without notice to the other side. The Thomas court 
described the purpose of Rule 41(a)(1) as follows: 
The purpose of Rule 41(a)(1) was to provide a simple and 
speedy method for a plaintiff to dismiss his action. Yet it was 
deemed necessary that there be a limitation upon this procedure 
in order to prevent vexatious suits and delays in litigation by 
repetitious filings and dismissals. One may wonder how such 
dismissals could vex or annoy a defendant who had not 
appeared or whether the rule is good or bad in its overall effect. 
However, we are here concerned only with the rule as it is, and 
whether the two dismissals act as an adjudication and preclude 
further litigation. So long as it is extant a plaintiff should not be 
able, in a perfunctory dismissal, to escape its consequences by 
the simple device of including in the order a recital that the 
dismissal is without prejudice. 
Id. at 514. 
The Thomas court concluded, "[i]n the instant case, from aught that appears 
on the record, the prior dismissals were made in a perfunctory manner. The trial court 
6 
it exists such dismissals operated as an adjudication 
against the plaintiffs upon the merits." hi. at 514 (emphasis added). 
The factual situation here is similar to that addressed by the Thymus ^mi:. 
First Equity filed and dismissed two complaints. The second dismissal was accomplished by 
motion and order. First Equity drafted the second oidci >I ilr missal i I 
u respective of that recital, the dismissal of First 
Equity's second complaint should operate as an adjudication on the merits, pursuant to Rule 
41(a), as it did in the Thomas case. 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision focuses on Thomas' use of the word 
"perfunctory" a* rmr r.^ si^ hn acnstu± ^kabUun, 'lotion to Dismiss "Tin/1 (in! nunil 
c h.: .. : ithin the. meaning of 
Thomas because plaintiff claimed to have had no choice in seeking the dismissal. However, 
the Thomas court made clear that "perfunctory" means not giving adverse parties in the case 
notice of plaintiff "s request foi dismissal llbv mo * 
a 111 IB 111 n > 11 of llif i miff spmfirallv to that issue. Id. at 513-514. 
In llii i ii ml ii|>|Viir i Ihiil Iiisl h|uih \ Mum v nl I hsmiss.il in ilic fir si \ ase 
a lie! motion and order of dismissal in the Federal Case were not served on any opposing 
parties or counsel and were, in the sense intended by the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas, 
perfunctory.2 
B. It is Immaterial Whether First Equity's Two Voluntary Dismissals 
Resulted in Harassment or Abuse 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision in this case also concludes First 
Equity's second dismissal did not result in "harassment or abuse of the system." The court 
opined that there had been no "compromise or vexatious result affecting the Defendant 
because the first two cases were filed but no service occurred", and concluded "the Plaintiff 
should not be punished for doing the right thing." 
As noted in Thomas at 514, although the Utah Supreme Court questioned 
whether the rule was "good or bad in its overall effect," the court also applied the rule "as 
it exists", and stated that the plaintiff should not be able to escape its consequences. In this 
case the trial court should have applied the rule "as it exists", and dismissed First Equity's 
third complaint without reference to whether it was punishing First Equity "for doing the 
right thing." 
2The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision: "[I]t should be noted that this 
was not a perfunctory dismissal. The dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction and 
voluntarily filled by the Plaintiff, because it would have been dismissed in any event by 
the Court itself absent Plaintiffs motion or on motion by the Defendant." (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 2). 
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nil < 'ouil i( Aiipr.'il'. in null ; .iildirssed this s.imc issue in LaAr 
at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. i Pacific Malibu Development Corp., 933 F.2d 724 (9th 
Cir. 1991), cert, denied 503 U.S. 920, 112 S Ct 1:295 (1/992:) In Lake, tin: Ninth < m nil 
In hi III ill in [ilLiiiilill < rtMiMiHi 11 ii s i rh i i i 1 J dunl in iliMiin1 il limit i Null lilii.iii " i n 
irrelevant in applying the rule and that an actual intent to harass or abuse the defendants was 
not required for application of the rule, stating "the rule does not require an inquiry into the 
circumstances of the two dismissals." I d, at / 2 7 3 
^ First Equity' s Dismissal of the Federal Case was Voluntary Within 
the Meaning of Rule 41(a) 
The Lake court also made short shrift of plaintiffs argument that it had no 
choice but to dismiss one of its previously filed suits and that accordingly Rule 41(a) should 
I 
involuntary, because after the bankruptcy of defendant Peter O. Phillips was dismissed, First 
Equity had no choice other than dismissing its claim filed in federal court. The Lake opinion 
states that "the term 'voluntary ' ' in Rule 41 means that the party is filing a dismissal without 
''Ilie Lake court notes that "a few cases have suggested that, in certain limited 
circumstances, the rule will not be literally applied, citing Poloron Prod., Inc. v. Lybh.;.<id 
Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1976). The Lake court goes 
on to distinguish Poloron and observes that its "holding" when followed, has been limited 
to its facts and does not preclude application of [Rule 41 (a)'s] Bat where the voluntary 
dismissal is unilateral." Id at 727. • 
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being compelled by another party or the court. It does not mean that other circumstances 
might have not compelled the dismissal or that the party desired it." Id. at 726. 
The Lake court goes on to state: 
Rule 41 distinguishes between voluntary or section (a), 
dismissals and involuntary, or section (b), dismissals on the 
basis of which party initiates the dismissal. And, while it 
delineates the bases upon which the defendant may seek an 
involuntary dismissal, it does not consider the plaintiff s reasons 
for seeking a voluntary dismissal. 
Id. 
The Lake court observed that the plaintiff in that case had alternatives to filing 
for voluntary dismissal, such as allowing defendants to move for a dismissal or registering 
the plaintiff corporation and then filing a motion with the court to have its case voluntarily 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2). Similarly, in this case First Equity could have allowed 
defendants in the Federal case to move for dismissal or could have pursued the remand 
motion it originally brought after dismissal of the Phillips bankruptcy case. Instead, First 
Equity voluntarily initiated the second dismissal, an action it should have known would 
trigger mandatory dismissal with prejudice of any third-filed case under Rule 41(a). 
10 
;kabehind Should be Dismissed, Even Though he was not Explicitly 
Named as a Defendant in First Equity's Initial First District Court 
Case. 
; i mplaint filed oo, \u<;ust 25, 2000, 
named John and Jane Does I-XXV as defendants. W ith respect to the "Doe" defendants the 
complaint stated as follows: 
Defendants John and Jane Does I-XXV are persons and entities 
unknown to the plaintiffs at this time \\> L ^ ^ artrd ;~ 
concert with or on behalf of named Defendants or othe^ the 
detriment of Plaintiffs or have clouded title to the nr ies 
si lbject4" a-' - ^"rtn. 
Appendix "A", paragraph »* i 
In paragraphs 64-75, 82-88, 100, 102 and 109, First Equity's first-filed 
complaint described specific acts undertaken and representations made by Skabelund along 
with defendant I Vlcr () Hullips. 
In the Federal Court action filed in September, 2000, although the complaint 
caption does not specifically iM 11 ii MJIHJKIHI I . »I ildm dim 11» • •• spiTifn «iH< IUHIK'HI i 
defe* caption to the Motion to Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal signed by 
Judge Campbell. 
In a similar case, Manning v. South Carolina Dept. Highway and Public 
Transportation, / a J 914 F ? J 4 4 (Mh Circuit 1 9Q0N thr rourt ruled that a named defendant 
who had been named as a ,>... .is .... *- ..i : i . , >. ti ; -. 
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff had filed a Section 1983 action 
in Federal Court against the highway department and a number of John Does, stating: 
John Doe and Richard Roe are individuals employed by the 
Federal or State Governments whose identities are at this time 
unknown to the Plaintiffs but who joined and participated in the 
acts and omissions set forth herein. 
Id. at 46. 
The complaint was voluntarily dismissed by notice. The second complaint was 
filed in state court and specifically named one of the John Does defendants as the state 
deputy attorney general. This suit was also dismissed by notice. The third lawsuit named 
the state official specifically. The court dismissed the state official who had been named as 
a John Doe defendant, stating: 
[R]es judicata extends not only to named parties to an action, 
but also to their privies. (Citation omitted) . . . . [T]he term 
"privy", when applied to a judgment or decree, means one so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same 
legal right. One in privity is one whose legal interests were 
litigated in the former proceeding . . . "Privity" as used in the 
context of res judicata or collateral estoppel, does not embrace 
relationships between person or entities, but rather it deals with 
a person's relationship to the subject matter of the litigation. 
M a t 48. 
The court held that since the state official was intended to be the defendant 
Doe named in the plaintiffs first action, the state official's legal rights were implicated in 
the initial suit, and therefore dismissal based on the two-dismissal rule was appropriate. 
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Hen; m i i. h i i I i il .illi ;,jihoii m I if %1 I -quitv's state and federal 
c inclusion of Skabelund among the defendants whom First Equity 
dismissed in the federal suit, that Skabelund was one of the John Doe delendants who ,K k tl 
in concert with or on behalf of named Defendants <' »ili " *• i »• IM • dvn i n i c i n ni P l a i n t i f f s . " 
Thei - . • ' that Skabelund is in privity with the other defendants named 
in the first and second lawsuits for the purposes of Rule 41(a). 
CONCLUSION 
First Equity s< nmpliiuil slmulil hi tlr mi* Mil "villi prejudice pursuant to Rule 
4 Hivil Procedure. 
I - t i n HI "i »i i (nil >00i 
KIPl M JIH1IRISTI \ ! I 1 .<'. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Attorneys for Gregory Skabelund 
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